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Dr Roger
Bowden
Roger
Bowden is a former Professor
of Economics and Finance at the
Victoria University of Wellington.
He is
a visiting research fellow in
financial system design at Ulm University in Germany. He
has worked at a number of offshore institutions, including the
universities of
Manchester
,
Western Australia
, and
New South Wales
as Professor of Finance. In addition Roger has been visiting
Professor of Economics at the universities of
California
at
Berkeley
and
British Columbia; held a Humboldt Foundation Senior Research
Award at
Bonn
University
; and visiting fellowships or appointments at the
Institute
of
Advanced Study
in
Vienna
, CEPREMAP in
Paris
, and the IBRD Development Research Department in
Washington
DC
. He holds the degrees of BA,
BSc
,
MA
(mathematics and econometrics,
Auckland
), PhD (economics,
Manchester
).
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NZCPR
Guest Forum
Roger
Bowden
13
November 2011
The
1% balance and Belshazzar’s Feast
They
straggled past down Cuba Street, an odd collection of gaunt
activists, earnest ladies and scruffy alternative lifestylers,
waving handwritten signs ‘WE ARE THE OTHER 99%’, and
handing out cyclostyled bits of paper on the scourges of
capitalism. It seemed hard to take them as any kind of threat
to the social order. But what started out as the ‘Occupy
Wall Street’ protest movement shows every sign of becoming
an international movement, with much larger marches in London,
Paris, Rome, Berlin, at times violent. Are these just the same
old woolly minded agit prop socialists, or do they have a
point? And if so, what if anything, should the policy makers
do about it?
The OWS
movement seems to have two things in mind. The first
proposition is that executives are too highly paid, and this
is bad as a matter of ‘social justice’, whatever this
means. Proposition 2 is that the consequential pursuit of such
enormous personal rewards has precipitated the economic
meltdowns that have engulfed the rest of us in horrifically
expensive public rescues. In what follows I’ll look largely
at Proposition 1; that’s enough without writing a book on
the consequences, which have still to be played out.
One thing
is for sure, that over past twenty years or so, there has been
a sea change in remuneration relativities. The average CEO in
the U.S. now gets paid 50 times the average wage and salary
earner. Just in
case you think that’s just President Obama’s problem,
think again. Last year, the local NZ boss of Westpac raked in
about NZ$5.5 million, which is roughly 100 times the average,
while the big boss in Australia pulled in a package worth a
whopping $55 million. Dynastic wealth in the making, so to
speak, and it’s a story repeated over a whole range of
companies, not just financials.
It’s a
far cry from even the late ‘eighties, where the CEO of
Westpac was thought well paid at a mere AUD400K (and was not
even their highest paid staff member). How did all this
happen? And is it a case of good ideas gone bad; so that
instead of Alfred Doolittle’s undeserving poor, we now have
the undeserving rich?
As usual,
you can blame the ‘academic scribblers’. In the mid to
late ‘eighties, several influential writers in economic
agency theory, notably Michael Jensen, argued that senior
managers were in fact systematically underpaid, in terms of
what they could potentially add to shareholder value. Variable
pay components, based on stock options and the like, could be
used to incentivise managers to take risks. Managers could
lever up their rewards if they habitually got it right – but
could be fired if they got it persistently wrong.
After a
slow start, the idea took off like a rocket, for it was an
idea that corporate executives wanted to hear. It was helped
along by the explosion of market making in derivative
financial products at the time, which offered enormous scope
for rewards based on the mark to market value of trader
portfolios. And a bit later in the early 00’s world interest
rates fell, putting huge pressure on banks and investment
funds to generate shareholder returns. By then CEO’s and
other senior managers had levered themselves up over the
traders they managed, while the movement spread to executives
of all manner of firms.
With the
general public, however, the penny had started to drop.
Academics turned downright critical when they noticed
that executive rewards had taken on a life all their own. In
particular, executive remuneration had become dislocated from
the company’s stock performance, so that even badly
performing companies continued to pay their CEO’s like
Midas.
Even if
this had not been so, operational questions could have been
asked. Is it the case that the firm has done well because I am
there? Or have I done
well because the firm is there? In other words, does my
package reflect attributable value that the firm derives from
my unique presence; or could just about anybody do the job,
and I am stratospherically paid simply because I have lucked
out in being there and pushing the right buttons on the way
up?
Unquestionably,
some executives are worth every penny, or even more. Just
think of Steve Jobs with Apple, or Lee Iacocca, the man who
saved Chrysler two decades earlier. Their special skills or
marketability are economically comparable with those of a
Michael Jackson, or Elvis Presley for Iacocca’s generation.
Economists would call it an economic rent, a return
to a valuable factor in limited supply. Likewise, some
market dealers are genuine talents in finding and pricing
trades. They may be obnoxious people, but this is economics
we’re talking about here, not Dr Phil.
But if
special skills of this kind are rare what, then, has been
ratcheting up executive remuneration packages to such
extremities, for what in so many cases are quite ordinary
talents? Lucian Bebchuk, of the Harvard Law School, identifies
the problem as one of influence and relationships, in
particular as between remuneration consultants and the company
remuneration committees that hire them to advise on executive
pay.
My own take
on the problem is that the remuneration consultants have
established comparator comparisons as their stock in trade. The
position, not the person, has become the arbiter. If
company X down the road pays their bosses $5m a year it would
be a brave consultant to recommend anything less for their
client company Y. And
a claimed requirement for intercompany comparability is a
convincing way to counter objections from pesky dissenting
shareholders at the annual general meeting. But to base any
kind of action on inter-agent comparisons is a great way to
generate contagion, and indeed economists have recently been
modelling such effects in the context of executive
remuneration.
Likewise,
consultants cite executive pay conventions based on such
statistics as the value of assets (good for bank executives!),
the annual turnover, or the number of employees. I suspect the
latter is why university vice chancellors in NZ are getting
such big pay hikes, no matter that in reality they are little
more than functionaries. Statistics, in other words, can be
used as an apparently objective tool to come to unwarranted
conclusions. Remuneration consultants have to this extent
become unwitting agents of contagion.
So what,
then, can or should be done to dampen down a spiral of pay
expectations, given its potential to generate damaging social
unrest? The global financial crisis precipitated a brief
flurry of regulator activity, aimed in part at excessive and
counterproductive executive bonuses in the finance industry.
The main outcome was to lengthen the vesting period of stock
options, meaning that a trader now has to wait longer to make
sure that his apparent mark to market trading gains don’t go
belly up a year later.
It looked
good at the time, but had little real effect. Even post the
GFC, much the same stories were emerging: of large bonus
guarantees to hire or retain traders in fields such as
commodity trading or shipping, or of resurgent bonus pools in
the trading of asset backed securities and credit default
swaps. Moreover, the attempts of finance industry regulators
have done nothing to dampen social perceptions that senior
executives in other industrial sectors are feeding from their
own trough.
Taxing the
trough feeders is one possible way to go. President Obama’s
proposed tax hikes for the rich won’t ever do much for the
US budget deficit, even were the US Senate to relent about
blocking them. The
social underclass is just getting too large, and things in the
US and Europe will get still worse as global economic changes
continue to impact upon regional production and incomes. I see
the main benefit of the Obama tax proposals, were they ever to
be accepted, as signalling a willingness of the part of them
that hath to support them that hath not. Call it what you
will: a social compact, social bribery, or whatever. One thing
the Occupy Wall Street movement might just succeed in doing is
to bring home to the Republicans that it might just be in
their longer term interest to realise that no man is an
island. Otherwise, Obama and his advisers are on to a good
thing for the next elections.
The tax
system aside, it’s difficult to see what else the government
of the day can do to fix the problem of ballooning income
inequality and the social stresses that will inevitably
result. Here in NZ, a reference to the new Financial Markets
Authority might help to delineate reasonable principles and
evidential criteria to apply to executive pay, at least in so
far as this applied to public companies. Likewise, the State
Services Commission might care to take a more critical look at
contagion with respect to public servant packages.
But in the
last analysis, the only thing that can really work is
shareholder activism and publicity, founded on good healthy
scepticism, both about the attributable value of the executives’ contribution and the
role of the remuneration consultants. Minority shareholders at
AGM’s can be a nuisance, but they do have a valuable social
role. And so have newspaper columnists; right on there Brian
Gaynor, for drawing our attention to the ratcheting up of
directors fees [1].
None of
this should serve to hinder exceptional rewards being paid to
exceptional people for exceptional contributions. The ragtag
Cuba Street mob, or some of them, might even agree to that.
It’s just an identification problem, the kind of thing I
used to write about in my early days as an econometrician.
Rest easy, Steve Jobs.
Footnote
[1] NZ
Herald, Saturday 22 October 2011.
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