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NZCPD
Guest Forum
THE
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE
AN APPEAL TO REASON
By
The Rt.
Hon. Lord Lawson
19 November 06
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THIS
IS A HIGHLY COMPLEX SUBJECT, involving as it does science,
economics and politics in almost equal measure. The Centre for
Policy Studies has kindly agreed to publish a greatly extended
version of this lecture as a pamphlet, in which I will be able
to do greater justice to that complexity and to quote the
sources of a number of the statements I propose to make this
evening. It will also enable me to deal at slightly greater
length with the scaremongering Stern Report, published earlier
this week. But the essence of it is what I have to say
tonight.
But
first, a very brief comment on Stern. If scaremongering seems
a trifle harsh, I should point out that, as a good civil
servant, he was simply doing his masters’ bidding. As Mr
Blair’s guru, Lord Giddens (the inventor of the so-called
third way), laid down in this context in a speech last year,
“In order to manage risk, you must scare people”.
In
fact, the voluminous Stern Report adds disappointingly little
to what was already the conventional wisdom – apart from a
battery of essentially spurious statistics based on
theoretical models and conjectural worst cases. This is
clearly no basis for policy decisions which could have the
most profound adverse effect on people’s lives, and at a
cost which Stern almost certainly underestimates. It is, in a
very real sense, the story of the
Iraq
war, writ large. So let us get back to basics, and seek the
answers to three questions, of increasing complexity.
First,
is global warming occurring? Second, if so, why? And third,
what should be done about it?
As
to the first question, there is of course little doubt that
the twentieth century ended warmer
than it began. According to the Hadley Centre for Climate
Prediction and Research, an offshoot of
Britain
’s Met Office:
“Although
there is considerable year-to-year variability in annual-mean
global temperature, an upward trend can be clearly seen;
firstly over the period from about 1920-1940, with little
change or a small cooling from 1940-1975, followed by a
sustained rise over the last three decades since then.”
This
last part is a trifle disingenuous, since what the graph
actually shows is that the sustained rise took place entirely
during the last quarter of the last century.
Moreover,
according to the Hadley Centre’s data, there has so far been
no further global warming since 1998. Whether the seven-year
hiatus since then marks a change of trend or merely an
unexplained and unpredicted blip in a continuing upward trend,
time will tell.
Apart
from the trend, there is of course the matter of the absolute
numbers. The Hadley Centre graph shows that, for the first
phase, from 1920 to 1940, the increase was 0.4 degrees
centigrade. From 1940 to 1975 there was a cooling of about 0.2
degrees. (It was during this phase that alarmist articles by
Professor James Lovelock and a number of other scientists
appeared, warning of the onset of a new ice age.) Finally,
since 1975 there has been a further warming of about 0.5
degrees, making a total increase of some 0.7 degrees over the
20th century as a whole (from 1900 to 1920 there was no
change).
Why,
then, has this modest – if somewhat intermittent – degree
of global warming seems to have occurred. Why has this
happened, and what does it portend for the future? The only
honest answer is that we don’t know.
The
conventional wisdom is that the principal reason why it has
happened is the greatly increased amount of carbon dioxide in
the atmosphere as a result of the rapid worldwide growth of
carbon-based energy consumption.
Now,
there is no doubt that atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide increased greatly during the 20th century – by some
30 per cent – and most scientists believe this increase to
be largely man-made. And carbon dioxide is one of a number of
so-called greenhouse gases whose combined effect in the
earth’s atmosphere is to keep the planet warmer than it
would otherwise be.
Far
and away the most important of these gases is water vapour,
both in its gaseous form and suspended in clouds. Rather a
long way back, carbon dioxide is the second most important
greenhouse gas – and neither, incidentally, is a form of
pollution.
It
is the published view of the Met Office that is it likely that
more than half the warming of recent decades (say 0.3 degrees
centigrade out of the overall 0.5 degrees increase between
1975 and 2000) is attributable to man-made sources of
greenhouse gases – principally, although by no means
exclusively, carbon dioxide.
But
this is highly uncertain, and reputable climate scientists
differ sharply over the subject. It is simply not true to say
that the science is settled; and the recent attempt of the
Royal Society, of all bodies, to prevent the funding of
climate scientists who do not share its alarmist view of the
matter is truly shocking.
The
uncertainty derives from a number of sources. For one thing,
the science of clouds, which is clearly critical, is one of
the least well understood aspects of climate science.
Another
uncertainty concerns the extent to which urbanisation (not
least in the vicinity of climate stations) has contributed to
the observed warming. There is no dispute that urbanisation
raises near-surface temperatures: this has long been observed
from satellite infra-red imagery. The uncertainty is over how
much of the estimated 20th century warming
this accounts for.
Yet
another uncertainty derives from the fact that, while the
growth in manmade carbon dioxide emissions, and thus carbon
dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere, continued
relentlessly during the 20th century, the global mean surface
temperature, as I have already remarked, increased in fits and
starts, for which there us no adequate explanation.
But
then – and this is the other great source of uncertainty –
the earth’s climate has always been subject to natural
variation, wholly unrelated to man’s activities.
Climate
scientists differ about the causes of this, although most
agree that variations in solar radiation play a key part.
It
is well established, for example, from historical accounts,
that a thousand years ago, well before the onset of
industrialisation, there was – at least in
Europe
– what has become known as the mediaeval warm period, when
temperatures were probably at least as high as, if not higher
than, they are today.
Going
back even further, during the
Roman empire
, it may have been even warmer. There is archaeological
evidence that in Roman Britain, vineyards existed on a
commercial scale at least as far north as Northamptonshire.
More recently, during the 17th and early 18th centuries, there
was what has become known as the little ice age, when the
Thames
was regularly frozen over in winter, and substantial ice fairs
held on the frozen river – immortalised in colourful prints
produced at the time – became a popular attraction.
Historical
treeline studies, showing how far up mountains trees are able
to grow at different times, which is clearly correlated with
climate change, confirm that these variations occurred outside
Europe
as well.
A
rather different account of the past was given by the
so-called “hockey-stick” chart of global temperatures over
the past millennium, which purported to show that the
earth’s temperature was constant until the industrialisation
of the 20th
century. Reproduced in its 2001 Report by the supposedly
authoritative Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, set
up under the auspices of the United Nations to advise
governments on what is clearly a global issue, the chart
featured prominently in (among other publications) the present
Government’s 2003 energy white paper. It has now been
comprehensively discredited.
But
it is not only over time that the earth’s climate displays
considerable natural variability. Change also varies
geographically. For example, there are parts of the world
where glaciers are retreating, and others where glaciers are
advancing. The fringes of the
Greenland
ice shelf appear to be melting, while at the centre of the
shelf the ice is thickening. Curiously enough, there are
places where sea levels are perceptibly rising, while
elsewhere they are static or even falling – suggesting that
local factors still dominate any global warming effects on sea
levels.
Again,
extreme weather events, such as major storms in the
Gulf of Mexico
, have come and gone, at irregular intervals, for as long as
records exist. Katrina, which caused so much damage to
New Orleans
, is regularly trotted out as a consequence of man-made
climate change; yet the region’s worst recorded hurricane
was that which devastated
Galveston
in 1900. Following Katrina, the world’s authorities on
tropical storms set up an international panel, which included
the relevant expert from the Met Office here in the
UK
. The panel reported, earlier this year, as follows:
“The
main conclusion we came to was that none of these high-impact
tropical cyclones could be specifically attributed to global
warming.”
This
may not be all that surprising, given how little global
warming has so far occurred; but I do not recall it featuring
in Mr Gore’s film.
But
this diversity makes it all too easy for the Al Gores of this
world to select local phenomena which best illustrate their
predetermined alarmist global narrative. We need to stick
firmly to the central point: what has been the rise in global
mean temperatures over the past hundred years, why we believe
this has occurred, how much temperatures are likely to rise
over the next hundred years or so, and what the consequences
are likely to be.
As
is already clear, the only honest answer is that we do not
know. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to try and guess;
and this is essentially what the IPCC has devoted itself to
doing. Its conclusion is that, by the end of this century, on
a business-as-usual basis, global mean temperature might have
risen by anything between 1 degree and 6 degrees centigrade.
This is based on a combination of the immensely complex
computer models of the relationship between carbon dioxide
concentrations and global temperature, developed by the Hadley
Centre and others, coupled with a range of different
projections of the likely growth of carbon dioxide emissions.
This
last part is not, of course, a scientific matter at all, but
consists of economic forecasting. That is to say, it depends
on the rate of world economic growth over
the
next hundred years (which in turn depends to a considerable
extent on the projected World
population), the energy-intensiveness of that growth, and the
carbon-intensiveness of the energy used.
The
upper part of the IPCC’s range of scenarios is distinctly
unconvincing, depending as it does either on an implausibly
high rate of population growth or, in particular, an unprecedented
growth in energy intensiveness, which in fact has been
steadily declining over the past 50 years.
Equally
implausible are its estimates of the costs of any warming that
may occur. For example, it makes great play of the damage to
agriculture and food production from climate change. Quite
apart from the fact there are many parts of the world where
agriculture and food production would actually benefit from a
warmer climate, the IPCC studies are vitiated by the fact that
they assume that farmers would carry on much as before,
growing the same crops in precisely the same way – the
so-called ‘dumb farmer’ hypothesis.
In
reality, of course, farmers would adapt, switching as the need
arose to strains or crops better suited to warmer climates, to
improved methods of irrigation, and in many cases by
cultivating areas which had hitherto been too cold to be
economic.
It
is important to bear in mind that, whatever climate alarmists
like to make out,
what
we are confronted with, even on the Hadley Centre/IPCC
hypothesis, is the probability of very gradual change over a
large number of years. And this is something to which it is
eminently practicable to adapt.
This
points to the first and most important part of the answer to
the question of what we should do about the threat of global
warming: adapt to it. There are at least three reasons why
adaptation is far and away the most cost-effective approach.
The
first is that many of the feared harmful consequences of
climate change, such as coastal flooding in low-lying areas,
are not new problems, but simply the exacerbation of existing
ones; so that addressing these will bring benefits even if
there is no further global warming at all.
The
second reason is that, unlike curbing carbon dioxide
emissions, this approach will bring benefits whatever the
cause of the warming, whether manmade or natural.
And
the third reason why adaptation – most of which,
incidentally, will happen naturally, that is to say it will be
market-driven, without much need for government intervention
– is the most cost-effective approach is that all serious
studies show that, not surprisingly, there are benefits as
well as costs from global warming. Adaptation enables us to
pocket the benefits while diminishing the costs.
The
main argument advanced against relying principally on
adaptation is that it is all right for the rich countries of
the world, but not for the poor, which is unacceptable.
As
Professor Mendelsohn of Yale, author of a number of studies of
the impact of climate change, has written,
“The
net damages to mid to high latitude countries [such as the
UK
] will be very small if not beneficial this coming century.
The impacts to poor low latitude countries will be harmful
across the board…Climate change will hurt the poorest people
in the world most.”
This
is no doubt true, although it is frequently exaggerated. But
it does mean that those of us in the richer countries of the
world have a clear moral obligation to do something about it
– not least because, if the man-made warming thesis is
correct, it is we who caused the problem.
According
to the IPCC, the greatest single threat posed by global
warming is coastal flooding as sea levels rise. Sea levels
have, in fact, been rising very gradually throughout the past
hundred years, and even the last IPCC Report found little sign
of any acceleration. Nevertheless, Sir Nicholas Stern, charged
by the Government to look into the economics of climate change
is particularly concerned about this, especially the alleged
melting of the
Greenland
ice sheet.
He
has written that:
“The
net effect of these changes is a release of 20 billion tonnes
of water to the oceans each year, contributing around 0.05
millimetres a year to sea-level rise.”
This
would imply an additional sea-level rise of less than a
quarter of an inch per century, something it ought not to be
too difficult to live with. But the major source of projected
sea-level rise is from ocean warming expanding the volume of
water. As a result, some of those low-lying areas already
subject to serious flooding could find things getting
significantly worse, and there is a clear case for government
money to be spent on improving sea defences in these areas.
The Dutch, after all, have been doing this very effectively
for the past 500 years. The governments of the richer
countries, like the
United States
with its Gulf coast exposure, can be left to do it for
themselves; but in the case of the poorer countries, such as
Bangladesh
, there is a powerful argument for international assistance.
Another
problem for the poorer and hotter countries of the world,
according to the IPCC, is an increase in vector-borne
diseases, notably malaria. This is more controversial. Most
experts believe that temperature has relatively little bearing
on the spread of the disease, pointing out that it was endemic
throughout
Europe
during the little ice age.
Be
that as it may, some two million children in the developing
world die every year from malaria as it is; and the means of
combating, if not eradicating, the scourge are well
established. There is, again, a clear case for international
assistance to achieve this.
Of
course assistance in either the building of effective sea
defences or in the eradication of malaria will cost money. But
that cost is only a very small fraction of what it would cost
to attempt, by substantially curbing carbon dioxide emissions,
to change the climate.
The
argument that we need to cut back substantially on carbon
dioxide emissions in order to help the world’s poor is
bizarre in the extreme. To the extent that their problems are climatic,
these problems are not new ones, even if they may be
exacerbated if current projections are correct. If, twenty
years ago, when as Chancellor I was launching the first
concerted poor-country debt forgiveness initiative,
subsequently known as the Toronto terms, anyone had argued
that the best way to help the developing countries was to make
the world a colder place, I would probably have politely
suggested that they see their
doctor.
It makes no more sense today than it would have done then.
Indeed,
it is worse than that. As Frances Cairncross, the Chairman of
the Economic and Social Research Council, pointed out in her
thoughtful and honest Presidential address on climate change
to the British Association’s annual conference in September,
the cost of effectively curbing carbon dioxide emissions
“will definitely be enormous”. Precisely how large it is
impossible to say – even by Sir Nicholas Stern. Last
year’s report on the economics of climate change by the
House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee quoted estimates
ranging from $80 billion a year to $1,100 billion a year. It
would depend greatly, among other things, on how it is
achieved and how soon – the earlier it is done the greater
the cost. Of critical importance is how great the increase in
the price of carbon would need to be to stifle the demand for
carbon sufficiently; and that we cannot know unless and until
we do it.
But
it is clear that the cost will be large enough, among other
consequences, to diminish significantly the export markets on
which the future prosperity of the developing countries at
least in part depends. So far from helping the world’s poor,
it is more likely to harm them.
Nevertheless,
curbing carbon dioxide emissions, along the lines of the
Kyoto
accord, under which the industrialised countries of the world
agreed to somewhat arbitrarily assigned limits to their CO2
emissions by 2012, remains the conventional answer to the
challenge of global warming. It is hard to imagine a more
absurd response.
Even
its strongest advocates admit that, even if fully implemented
(which it is now clear it will not be, and there is no
enforcement mechanism), the existing Kyoto agreement, which
came into force last year, would do virtually nothing to
reduce future rates of global warming. Its importance, in
their eyes, is as the first step towards further such agreements
of a considerably more restrictive nature. But this is wholly
unrealistic, and fundamentally flawed for a number of reasons.
In
the first place, the
United States
, the largest source of carbon dioxide emissions, has refused
to ratify the treaty and has made clear its intention of
having no part in any future such agreements.
The
principal American objection is that the developing countries
– including such major contributors to future carbon dioxide
emissions as
China
,
India
and
Brazil
– are effectively outside the process and determined to
remain so. Indeed, both
China
and
India
currently subsidise carbon-based energy.
The
developing countries’ argument is a simple one. They contend
that the industrialised countries of the western world
achieved their prosperity on the basis of cheap carbon-based
energy; and that it is now the turn of the poor developing
countries to emulate them. And they add that if there is a
problem now of excessive carbon dioxide concentrations
in the earth’s atmosphere, it is the responsibility of those
that caused it to remedy it. Nor are they unaware of the
uncertainty of the science on the basis of which they are
being asked to slow down their people’s escape from grinding
poverty.
The
consequences of the exclusion of the major developing
countries from the process are immense.
China
alone last year embarked on a programme of building 562 large
coalfired power stations by 2012 – that is, a new coal-fired
power station every five days for seven years. Putting it
another way,
China
is adding the equivalent of
Britain
’s entire power-enerating capacity each year. Since
coal-fired power stations emit roughly twice as much carbon
dioxide per gigawatt of electricity as gas-fired ones, it is
not surprising that it is generally accepted that within the
next 20 years
China
will overtake the
United States
as the largest source of emissions.
India
, which like
China
has substantial indigenous coal reserves, is set to follow a
similar path, as is
Brazil
.
Then
there is the cost of the
Kyoto
approach to consider. The logic of
Kyoto
is to make emissions permits sufficiently scarce to raise
their price to the point where carbon-based energy is so
expensive that carbon-free energy sources, and other
carbon-saving measures, become fully economic. This clearly
involves a very much greater rise in energy prices than
anything we have yet seen. The trebling of oil prices since
Kyoto
was agreed in 1997 has done little to reduce carbon emissions.
There
must be considerable doubt whether a rise in energy prices on
the scale required would be politically sustainable.
Particularly when the economic cost, in terms of slower
economic growth, would be substantial.
In
reality, if the
Kyoto
approach were to be pursued beyond 2012, which is –
fortunately – unlikely, the price increase would in practice
be mitigated in the global economy in which we now live. For
as energy prices in Europe started to rise, with the prospect
of further rises to come, energy-intensive industries and
processes would progressively close down in Europe and
relocate in countries like
China
, where relatively cheap energy was still available.
No
doubt Europe could, at some cost, adjust to this, as it has to
the migration of most of its textile industry to
China
and elsewhere. But it is difficult to see the point of it. For
if carbon dioxide emissions in Europe are reduced only to see
them further increased in
China
, there is no net reduction in global emissions at all. The
extent of ill-informed wishful thinking on this issue is hard
to exaggerate.
To
take just one example, the government’s 2003 energy White
Paper proposed a 60 per cent reduction in the UK’s carbon
dioxide emissions by 2050, based on the notion of supplying
most if not all of the country’s electricity needs from
renewable sources, notably that particularly trendy source,
wind power.
But
as experienced electrical engineers have pointed out,
government estimates of the cost of wind power are grossly
understated, since wind power (like most renewable sources of
energy) is intermittent. In other words, the wind doesn’t
blow all the time. But the electricity supply does have to be
on tap all the time. Given the fact that electricity cannot be
economically stored on an industrial scale, this means that
conventional generating capacity would have to be fully
maintained to meet demand when the wind stops blowing, thus
massively adding to the true cost of wind power.
There
are all sorts of things we can do, from riding a bicycle to
putting a windmill on our roof, that may make us feel good.
But there is no escaping the two key truths. First, there is
no way the growth in atmospheric carbon dioxide can be
arrested without a very substantial
rise in the cost of carbon, presumably via the imposition of a
swingeing carbon tax, which would require, at least in the
short to medium term, a radical change of lifestyle in the
developed world. Are we seriously prepared to do this? (A tax
would at least be preferable to the capricious and corrupt
rationing system which half-heartedly exists today under
Kyoto
.)
And
the second key truth is that, even if we were prepared to do
this, it would still be useless unless the major developing
nations – notably
China
,
India
and
Brazil
– were prepared to do the same, which they are manifestly
and understandably not.
So
we are driven back to the need to adapt to a warmer world, and
the moral obligation of the richer countries to help the
poorer countries to do so.
It
is clear that, despite the regrettable arrogance and
intolerance of the Royal Society, the uncertainty surrounding
the complex issue of climate change is immense, and the scope
for honest differences of view considerable. But uncertainty
cuts both ways.
While
it may well be the case that, on a business as usual basis,
the earth is highly unlikely to get as warm as the climate
alarmists tell us it will over the next hundred years, we
cannot be sure: it might.
In
particular, we cannot be completely sure that, at some far-off
point, it might not warm sufficiently to trigger what the IPCC
refers to as “large-scale singular events”.
The
most frequently talked about such event is that it might reach
a point where it shuts down or reverses the Gulf Stream, which
keeps Europe’s temperatures up to 8 degrees centigrade
warmer than they would otherwise be. So global warming might
paradoxically make
Europe
seriously colder.
So
far, of course, there is no sign of this. And according to
many reputable oceanographers, there could never be – at
least not as a consequence of global warming. In their
understanding of the science, the
Gulf Stream
is primarily wind-driven, and thus will continue to exist
regardless of the future temperature of the planet.
But
inevitably we cannot be absolutely sure; and the same applies
to all the other much-discussed disasters.
It
is at this point that the so-called precautionary principle is
invoked. Conventional cost-benefit analysis is irrelevant, it
is argued. A climate catastrophe may be unlikely; but if it
occurred the consequences would be so appalling that we must
do whatever it takes, here and now, to prevent it. At first
sight this seems a persuasive argument. But a moment’s
reflection shows its shortcomings as a guide to practical
policy decisions.
In
the first place, while the prospect of catastrophic
consequences from global warming cannot be regarded as
impossible, nor can a number of other possible catastrophes.
It
is perfectly possible, for example, that over the next hundred
years or so, the world might enter another ice age. There is
ample evidence that this has happened at fairly regular
intervals over the long history of the planet, and that we are
overdue for another one.
More
immediately – and thus demanding much more urgent attention
and priority in the expenditure of resources – there are the
possible consequences of nuclear proliferation to worry about,
not to mention the growth in the terrorist threat in an age
when scientific and technological developments have brought
the means of devastation within the reach of even modestly
funded terrorist groups.
Above
all, in a world of inevitably finite resources, not only can
we not possibly spend large sums on guarding against any and
every possible eventuality in the future; but the more we do
spend on this the less there is available to deal with poverty
and disease in the present.
Perhaps
the most important application of the precautionary principle
is to the precautionary principle itself. Otherwise we may
find ourselves doing very stupid things in its name.
As
a general rule, rationality suggests that we concentrate on
present crises, and on future ones where the probability of
disaster if we do not act appears significant – usually
because the signs of its emergence are already
incontrovertible. The fact that a theoretical danger would be
devastating is not enough to justify substantial expenditure.
A
modest degree of global warming clearly occurred during the
last quarter of the 20th century, but the evidence that this
will now accelerate to disastrous levels is, to say the least,
unconvincing, for the reasons I have already set out. If we
are going to take out an insurance
policy against the remote risk of a warming-induced climate
disaster then it needs to be both affordable and effective.
The conventional front-runner, a substantial enhancement of
the
Kyoto
approach of curbing carbon dioxide emissions satisfies neither
of these requirements. It is not affordable, in the sense that
the people of Europe – to whom Kyoto largely applies – are
not prepared to make the sacrifices in terms of the drastic
change in lifestyle required, and it is ineffective, since the
major nations of the developing world – quite apart from the
United States – are, for good reason, not prepared to join
the party.
The
notion that if we in the
UK
are prepared to set an example, then the rest of the world
will follow, is reminiscent of the old unilateralist CND
argument that if we in the
UK
abandoned nuclear weapons, then the Soviet Union and the
United States
would follow suit, and just as far-fetched.
Apart
from creating the conditions most favourable to technological
innovation, the only practicable insurance policy, on which a
great deal of serious work has been done in the United States
(a potentially important ‘workshop’ on this is to be held
in San Francisco ater
this month), concerns what has become known as
geo-engineering: taking active action to cool the planet, in
relatively short order, should the need become pressing.
The
front runner here is the idea of blasting aerosols into the
stratosphere, so as to impede the sun’s rays. Such grand
schemes obviously need to be approached with caution; but it
is striking that they have gained the support of scientists of
the eminence of the Nobel Prize-winner Paul Crutzen. Another
possibility may be the geo-engineering of clouds, which play
such a large part – far greater than carbon dioxide – in
determining the earth’s climate. The insurance policy is to
spend government money on further research into
geo-engineering, and on developing the capability (where this
does not already exist) to put it into practice should the
need arise.
Essentially,
I have sought to argue three key propositions. First, the
relatively new and highly
complex science of climatology is an uncertain one, and
neither scientists nor politicians serve either the truth or
the people by pretending to know more than they do.
Second,
far and away the most rational response to such climate change
as, for any reason, may occur, is to adapt to it.
And
third, the rich countries of the temperate world have an
obligation to assist the poor countries of the tropical world
to undertake whatever adaptation may be needed.
It
is not difficult to understand, however, the appeal of the
conventional climate change wisdom. Throughout the ages
something deep in man’s psyche has made him receptive to
apocalyptic warnings: “the end of the world is nigh”.
Almost
of all us are imbued with a sense of guilt and a sense of sin,
and it is so much less uncomfortable to divert our attention
away from our individual sins and causes of guilt, arising
from how we have treated our neighbours, and to sublimate it
in collective guilt and collective sin.
Throughout
the ages, too, the weather has been an important part of the
narrative. In primitive societies it was customary for extreme
weather events to be explained as punishment from the gods for
the sins of the people; and there is no shortage of examples of
this theme in the Bible, either – particularly but not
exclusively in the Old Testament.
The
main change is that the new priests are scientists (well
rewarded with research grants for their pains) rather than
clerics of the established religions, and the new religion is
eco-fundamentalism. But it is a distinction without much of a
difference. And the old religions have not been slow to make
common cause.
Does
all this matter? Up to a point, no. Unbelievers should not be
dismissive of the comfort that religion can bring. If people
feel better when they buy a hybrid car and see a few windmills
dotted about (although perhaps not in their own back yard),
then so be it. And in a democracy, if greenery is what the
people want, politicians will understandably provide it,
dressed in the most high-flown rhetoric they can muster.
Indeed,
if people are happy to pay a carbon tax, provided it is not at
too high a level, and the proceeds are used to cut income tax,
that would not be a disaster, either. It would have to be a
consumer-based tax, however, since in the globalised world
economy industry is highly mobile, whereas individuals are
much less so.
But
the new religion of eco-fundamentalism does present dangers on
at least three levels.
The
first is that the governments of Europe, fired in many cases
by anti-Americanism (never underestimate the extent to which
distaste for President Bush has fuelled the anti-global
warming movement), may get so carried away by their rhetoric
as to impose measures which do serious harm to their
economies. That is a particular danger at the present time in
this country. No doubt, when the people come to suffer the
results they will insist on a change of policy, or else vote
the offending government out of office. But it would be better
to avoid the damage in the first place.
The
second, and more fundamental, danger is that the global
Salvationist movement is profoundly hostile to capitalism and
the market economy. There are already increasing calls
for green protectionism – for the imposition of trade
restrictions against those countries which fail to agree to
curb their carbon dioxide emissions. Given the fact that the
only way in which the world’s poor will ever be able to
escape from their poverty is by embracing capitalism and the
global market economy, this is not good news.
But
the third danger is even more profound. Today we are very
conscious of the threat we face from the supreme intolerance
of Islamic fundamentalism. It could not be a worse time to
abandon our own traditions of reason and tolerance, and to
embrace instead the irrationality and intolerance of
ecofundamentalism, where reasoned questioning of its mantras
is regarded as a form of blasphemy. There is no greater threat
to the people of this planet than the retreat from reason we
see all around us today.
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