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Dr Elizabeth Rata
teaches in the Faculty of Education at the University of
Auckland and is also an Honorary Research Fellow in Political
Studies and a founding member of the Politics of Social
Regulation Research Group. She was a Fulbright Senior Scholar to
Georgetown University, Washington DC in 2003.
Her
internationally published research examines the politics of
ethnicity as a major force in contemporary social change, with a
focus on the use of ethnic and indigenous ideologies by emergent
elites.
Her new book, Public Policy and Ethnicity, the Politics of
Ethnic Boundary Making, edited by Rata and Roger Openshaw
and published by Palgrave, examines the politics of ethnicity
and culture.
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Guest Forum
Elizabth
Rata
Author
11 February 07
Ethnic
Fundamentalism in New Zealand
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I
describe ethnic fundamentalism or culturalism as a ‘secular
religion’ because this particular way of understanding what
ethnicity means shares a number of important features with
religion. First, it is a set of beliefs about human nature.
Second, those beliefs are unchallenged and unchallengeable.
Third, ethnic fundamentalism rejects doubt and has a difficult
relationship with reason (despite Benedict’s recent speech).
The
need to keep beliefs that are not exposed to the challenges of
doubt, reason and judgement away from politics is the reason
why the separation of church and state, the separation of
science and religion are at the heart of democracy. Democracy
is peaceful battle. It can work only if its battles are fought
with reason not with blind faith. Reason is the democratic
method. Those forces that enter the political arena without a
commitment to reason are deeply subversive of democracy. One
such is ethnic fundamentalism.
This
morning I want to describe five beliefs of ethnic
fundamentalism in order to show how the politicisation of
ethnicity is subverting democracy in
New Zealand
. But before I do I need to clarify my terms. ‘Ethnicity’
refers to a combination of culture - what we do and how we
understand ourselves, - and genetic inheritance (or race).
Ethnicity became popular in the social sciences in the late
1960s and spread rapidly into common usage. It was an attempt
to ‘edit out’ the increasingly discredited term ‘race’
from our vocabularies. However changing a word does not change
the concept. Ethnicity does not mean culture only. It has a
genetic, biological, i.e. race, component that does not go
away simply because it is an uncomfortable notion for the
social constructivists amongst us.
The
confusion which dogs these words was vividly demonstrated in
the responses by Pita Sharples and Willie Jackson to Don
Brash’s latest musings on the complexity of identity.
According to Pita Sharples (as quoted in Monday’s Herald
when describing what it is to be Maori. ‘Culture is not
about the amount of blood you have, it is about beliefs,
customs and aspirations.’ Well, that it true, but to be
eligible for the Maori electoral roll and to claim tertiary
Maori scholarships, one does in fact need the blood. It is
disingenuous of Pita Sharples to ignore this fact. Willie
Jackson, on the other hand, did refer to ‘whakapapa’ as
‘what determined being Maori, the ability to link
genetically to a Maori ancestor’. Put both these
explanations together and we have a more complete
understanding of ethnicity. It is about identifying with a
particular social group in order to live a certain way – ie
culture) and it is also about genetic or racial inheritance
being the means to classifying oneself with that particular
group.
Interestingly
I have noticed in recent months that the ‘softer’ term
‘diversity’ is increasingly favoured in light of
‘ethnicity’s inability to shrug off its genetic or race
component. However, softening the words, first by replacing
‘race’ with ‘ethnicity’, then by replacing ethnicity
with diversity doesn’t however change the concept itself –
the idea of identifying with a social group on the basis of
genetic ancestry. - Not that there is anything wrong with that
in itself.
Now
– I want to turn to what the problem really is but first I
need to describe the five main beliefs of ethnic
fundamentalists or culturalists. The first belief holds that
our ethnic or racial identity is our primary and determining
personal identity. This denies the fact that identity in the
modern democratic world is individual identity. The modern
person is the autonomous, self-creating, self-directed,
independent individual who makes choices (even the choice not
to exercise choice and not to be independent). This privilege
of choice was not available to our ancestors who were locked
into the birth-ascribed identities of traditional cultures. It
is not available today to the millions who live under
neotraditionalist elites –these are theocracies and
oligarchies (such as the Tongan elite) who use traditional
beliefs as political controls on others while themselves
enjoying the fruits of modernity.
We
modern individuals make choices about which identity matters
the most to us, - which identity is the one that we will
invest with enormous subjective meaning. An example is the
well-educated professional class of the 1980s who chose to
identify in ethnic terms, - and referred to themselves with
considerable pride as ‘pakeha’. Not all
settler-descendants chose to do so. The interesting question,
and one I don’t have time to discuss here, is why a
particular group within the post-war new middle class chose an
ethnic identity. Previously of course, the term ‘pakeha’
was one used in the main by Maori to describe those who
arrived from
Britain
and their descendants. It is unusual to find a group,
particularly a relatively privileged middle class group, who
take on an ethnicised identity as the identity of choice. It
does appear however, that, since the early 1990s there has
been a silent retreat from that process.
For
many people, the meaning of who they are is intimately tied to
the idea of ethnic belonging. There are those who choose their
primary social identity to be pakeha. Others, with Maori
ancestry, choose Maori identity as their defining
subjectivity. From a democratic point of view the right to
choose a determining identity, including an ethnicised one,
must be supported. It is the same for those who wish to define
themselves in religious terms. As long as such identities
remain private choices, practised in association with others
of like minds, there is no problem however much one may
dislike the emphasis on a primary identity that is genetically
based. It is the right of an individual in a democratic
country to make that choice.
Second,
the belief that the ethnic or racial group is primordial –
existing from the beginning of time and known through the
mythologies that are regarded as histories -
that the group is distinctive and separate. This denies
the universal human reality of migration, genetic mixing and
social mixing. It certainly denies the
New Zealand
reality.
Third,
the belief that how people live and understand their lives
(culture) is caused
by who they are (their ancestral descent or ethnicity/race).
Who we are in terms of the ancestral genetic group causes
what we do and the meaning we give to our actions. (i.e.
culture). It is a belief that has taken on its own life in
education. Such cultural determinism is behind the idea of
kaupapa Maori research, ‘Maori maths’, ‘Maori
pedagogy’, ‘Maori research’ and so on. It is currently
being extended to the idea of a Pasifika pedagogy. The
equivalent in
India
is the idea of Vedic science the Hinduteva fundamentalism that
made huge roads in
India
during the 1990s and is roundly criticized by the philosopher,
Meera Nanda. According to this belief how a person thinks,
behaves and relates to others is caused by ‘blood’ or in
more acceptable terms, by ‘spirit’. It is biological
determinism or racism dressed in intellectual garb.
Fourth,
the belief that an ethnic group indigenous to an area is
autochthonous, that is, the group is ‘of the land’ in a
way that is qualitatively different from those who arrive
later. The important point here is that – as a consequence
of this fact – the first group claims a particular political
status with entitlements not available to others. It is
‘blood and soil’ ideology, located in mythological origins
and seductive in its mystical appeal. By separating those who
are ‘indigenous’ from those who are not – in terms of
political recognition, a fundamental categorisation occurs
which then becomes built into political institutions. Such a
categorisation principle can be extended – why not have a
number of ‘classes’ of citizens – those who arrived
first, those who came a little later, while those who have
only just arrived, - a most unfortunate class indeed. In time
it is quite possible that these ‘classes’ could become
rigid caste divisions.
The
fifth belief is that because of the claim of the primacy of
ethnicity as the mechanism for classifying social groups,
individuals should be classified as members of ethnic
categories and that these groups should be the bearers of
political rights and be recognised in the public and political
sphere. This means that membership of an ethnic category takes
precedence over citizenship as a person’s primary political
status. This is perhaps the most serious of all the beliefs in
this racial ideology because of its implications for national
cohesion and democratic government. It is where ethnic
fundamentalism becomes a major problem for us all.
Since
the 1970s, the world-wide shift to identity politics has led
to the politicisation of ethnicity. This means officially
classifying and categorising people according to their ethnic
or racial heritage. It is now pervasive in all areas of state
and public activity in this country, particularly and most
dangerously in education, including those places which should
be the bastions of disinterested science, the universities.
New Zealand
is not alone of course. In fact I have chosen a
UK
example of how ridiculous the process of ethnic classification
can be because it is an extreme version – though we are not
far behind.
The
example is taken from the
United Kingdom
’s Department for Education and Skills’ Race Equality
Scheme. The document makes use of a plethora of terms. Within
the space of a few pages the reader can find: ethnic groups;
Asian backgrounds; Chinese and Indian (in the UK); White
British; ethnic minority groups; Black Caribbean pupils; Black
and Asian students; Black British; Asian British (all on the
same page); minority ethnic groups; pupils from Pakistani and
Bangladeshi backgrounds; BME which is explained in a Glossary
at the end of the document as meaning Black and Minority
Ethnic; BEMG which is said to refer to Black Ethnic Minority
Group; Traveller; Irish heritage; Gypsy/Roma; individual
minority ethnic groups; Black young people; White British
young people; Black young males; and Ethnic Minority and
ethnic diversity; Black, Asian and people of mixed ethnic
origin.
I
need add here that I am talking about politicising
ethnicity. I am not talking about the social reality –
that we do have diverse communities where we meet as Maori, as
Irish, as Hindu, as Muslims, as Rotarians, as Anglicans, as
inline hockey players, as Plunket parents, as alienated youth,
as Skeptics and so on. For some people, ethnic identity is
extremely important and for these, associating with others of
the same ethnicity to practise the culture of the group is
necessary for their well-being. For others, such
identification is much less so. Like religion, like lifestyle
identities, maintaining close ties with others whom we regard
as ‘like us’ can provide psychological security and
stability in a complex world. I have no quarrel with this and
fully support the wonderfully vibrant celebrations of diverse
cultures (some ethnic based, some religious, some life-style)
that occur throughout the country. This includes Maori
television, Chinese New Year celebrations, theatre and music
which has its origins in
Europe
, contemporary youth culture, and so on.
What
I do consider a serious problem is politicising these forms of
social classification so that ethnic categories become a means
for the public recognition of people. Individuals are treated
by government and its agencies, including schools and
hospitals, as members of their ethnic group. This is so
serious because the democratic political arena is where we
meet as New Zealanders, as equal citizens of a united nation.
That public arena is textured by the contributing communities
certainly, but it is the place where we unite – as a social
group that is also a political entity - because if we don’t
– why have a nation –
New Zealand
? The
New Zealand
nation exists because it has both a site – the state – and
a subject – the citizen.
Obviously
we want to recognise the social reality that New Zealanders
are descended from a range of ethnic ancestries and, as a
result, contain groups who do wish to maintain a range of
different cultural values, beliefs and practices. That is
their democratic right. However, while retaining those links
with our various histories we also need to identity with the
larger
New Zealand
social group that is present and future oriented. The past
does matter but so too does the future.
Since
the 1970s, we have worked systematically, particularly in
education, to demolish the political and symbolic structures
of nationhood. These are the tangible and intangible forces
that create and maintain social cohesion and a sense of
belonging to the nation ‘
New Zealand
’. Without a common national identity what is to stop
New Zealand
going the way of other fragmenting nations?
That
there is considerable uncertainty about how to classify ‘New
Zealander’ is demonstrated by the response to the census
last year. Here a number of people insisted on recording New
Zealanders as their ethnicity. Of course this exacerbated the
problem. It turned a term that refers to national identity
into one that refers to ethnic identity
- reducing ‘New Zealander’ to just one of a number
of ethnic categories in the process. However it did show that
there is considerable frustration about politicising ethnic
categories when the political category of a democracy is
citizenship of the nation.
The
problem is that when we politicise ethnicity – by
classifying, categorising and institutionalising people on the
basis of ethnicity – we establish the platform for
ethno-nationalism. There are sufficient examples of
ethno-nationalism in contemporary times, let alone horrific
examples from history, for us to be very wary of a path that
replaces the individual citizen with the ethnic person as the
political subject.
Interestingly
the process of ethnic politicisation is one driven by small
well-educated elites. In
Rwanda
for example, the ethnic doctrine ‘the Mahutu Manifesto’ of
1953 was written and promulgated by eleven highly educated
individuals identifying politically as Hutu. Even the killing
weapons in the 1994 genocide, the machetes and scythes, were
deliberately chosen and imported in their tens of thousands to
represent the glorious new peasant ethnic republic that was
about to dawn (once its ‘enemies’ had been eliminated).
The raw material of the ethnic ideologies that fuelled the
violence in
Bosnia
and
Serbia
was supplied by intellectuals. Pol Pot began his killing
campaigns immediately on his return from study in
Paris
.
In
New Zealand
we are obviously not far down the track towards
ethno-nationalism. However we need to recognise that the ideas
which fuel ethnic politics are well-established and
naturalised in this country and that the politicisation of
ethnicity is underway. The idea that people should be
recognised in government institutions, such as schools and
universities, by their ethnic category, is part of such racial
ideology, part of the ethnic fundamentalism that is so
difficult to challenge because if one does so one is labeled
racist or anti-Maori (despite the opposite being the case). (I
would make a distinction here between ethnic categories that
are permanently institutionalised and policies that are
temporary and needs-based – pragmatic responses to needs
that do characterise certain groups at particular times, -
needy groups defined sometimes by ethnicity, sometimes by
gender, and sometimes by life-style.)
Ethnic
fundamentalism itself must be challenged, not only because of
its potential threat to democracy but because the challenge
itself is democracy in action. All ideas, all movements should
be required to account for themselves through rational debate.
My
main purpose this morning has been to contribute to such a
debate, to identity the beliefs of ethnic fundamentalism and
to ask why should ethnic identity be more fundamental, more
primary, more determining of our lives, than national
identity? This is a decision we make for ourselves. We choose
what matters to us. Yet for several decades, the decision has
been, under the bicultural banner, to prioritise ethnicity.
The problem with that approach is that we can’t change who
are ancestors are.
Ethno-nationalism
is the antithesis of democratic nationalism because the former
creates its political categories from the past while
democratic nationalism has one political category – that of
citizenship, a category that quite rightly looks more to the
future than to the past in order to include individuals of all
ethnicities, religions and lifestyles.
Ethnic
fundamentalism is no better, no worse than the myriad of other
fundamentalism that some individuals impose upon themselves
(or have imposed upon them) to give their lives meaning. It
becomes a danger to liberal societies regulated by democratic
politics is when ethnicity is politicised. By politicising
ethnicity, by basing this manmade system of classification and
categorisation on historical rather than contemporary group
membership, we set ourselves on the path to ethno-nationalism.
We shall reap as we have sown.
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References
Rata,
E. and Openshaw, R. (2006)
Public Policy and Ethnicity: The Politics of Ethnic
Boundary-Making, Palgrave Macmillan Publishers. To be
launched at the ‘The Anatomy of Power’ Symposium, 11
November 2006, Conference Room,
22 Symonds Street
, The University of Auckland. 2 – 6 pm.
Stokes, J. (2006) ‘Brash Outrages Maori By Questioning Their
Identity’,
New Zealand
Herald, 25 September, A3.
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